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WHEN LEGACIES SHOULD BEGIN TO DRAW
INTEREST IN ILLINOIS
JAMES

R.

HEMINGWAY

1

N the Ecclesiastical Courts of England were developed
the rules governing administration of estates which
are largely followed by our probate and county courts;
most of those concerning legacies were developed in the
English Chancery Courts with the aid of some of the
rules laid down by the former courts. 2 The courts of
England and, with few exceptions, the courts of the
states, have followed these early established rules.
Unless they are contrary to the policy of the law in
Illinois-and there is no reason to believe they arethese rules likely would be followed here.
A well-established rule in England and in this country
is that legacies carry interest from the time they are
payable. In general, unless some other time for payment is set by the will, a legacy is deemed payable one
year after the testator's death.s This rule was developed to accord with that reputed to have been adopted
by the Ecclesiastical Courts from the civil law which
allowed the executor one year in which to ascertain the
extent of the testator's assets and to pay his debts.
That a legacy is not payable for a year does not conflict
with the law of the vesting of legacies. A legacy given
without condition and without reference to time may be
vested as of the testator's death, but the executor cannot be compelled by a legatee to make payment within a
year, even though the testator so directs, unless the
1LI.B. Fellow at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2Holdsworth's History of English Law, VI, pp. 652, 654; Pearson
v. Pearson, 1 Sch. & Lef. 10; Beckford v. Tobin, 1 Ves. Sr. 308.
3 Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. Jr. 10; Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 4 Ves. Jr. 1;
The State ex rel. Brown v. Crossley et al., 69 Ind. 203; Rice v: Boston
Port & Seaman's Aid Society, 56 N. H. 191; Wheeler v. Brem, 33 Miss.
126; Sullivan et ux. v. Winthrop et al., 1 Sumn. 1.
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executor chooses to do so. 4 So, to prevent uncertainty
in the law, the courts generally have established as an
arbitrary rule that, unless otherwise directed by the will,
a legacy is payable for the purpose of drawing interest,
one year after the testator's death, and that this rule
will be applied without reference to special circumstances
delaying the time when the legacy is actually paid. Thus,
the rule has not been altered by the fact that no probate
was had until some time lapsed after the testator's
death, 5 that the assets from which the legacy was to be
paid could not be collected within one year from the testator's death,6 that the testator by his will allowed more
than a year in which to settle his estate, 7 that the statute
provided the executor should have one year from probate to pay legacies," and even that the legatees themselves participated in a contest delaying distribution.9
It was early held that if the estate were productive,
interest would be due on a general pecuniary legacy from
the date of the testator's death;1O but the fact that the
estate was productive was disregarded in later cases,
and no exception was made even under such circumstances.'
Some of the states have come to the conclusion that where the statute or the practice of the probate
court allows the executor at least one year from the date
of issuance of letters testamentary to wind up the affairs
of the testator, legacies are to be deemed payable at
that time rather than one year from the date of the testator 's death.1 2 It was some time before this rule was
4 Benson v. Maude, Mad. & Geld. 15; Couch v. Eastman, 29 W. Va.
784. Unless refunding bond is given, Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929) Ch.
3, par. 119.
5Ogden v. Pattee, 149 Mass. 82.
6Koon's and Wright's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 621; Vermont State
Baptist Convention v. Ladd, 58 Vt. 95.
7 Warwick v. Ely, 59 N. J. Eq. 44; In re Spencer, 16 R. I. 25;
Chambers' Guardian v. Chambers' Executors, 87 Ky. 144.
8 Davison v. Rake, 44 N. J. Eq. 506; Lawrence v. Embree, 3 Bradf.
Sur. 364.
9 Woodward's Estate v. Holton et al., 78 Vt. 254; O'Leary et al.
v. Smock, 95 N. J. Eq. 267. Contra, Goodman v. Palmer et al., 137
Tenn. 556.
10 Maxwell v. Wetherhall, 2 P. Wms. 25.
"Gibson v. Bott, 7 Ves. Jr. 96.
12 Wheeler v. Hathaway, 54 Mich. 574; Gray et al. v. Case School
of Applied Science, 62 Oh. St. 1; In re McGowan, 124 N. Y. 526.
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definitely settled in New York, where the Surrogate
Courts persisted
in applying the general rule regardless
1
of the statute. 3
Upon the full consideration of the reasoning of the
courts on the question of whether or not interest should
be payable from one year from the date of death or one
year from the date of issuance .of letters, the former
appears far the more logical. One year from the testator's death is a fixed and definite time; one year from
the date of letters is not, which fact would lead to more
disadvantages than advantages. In adhering to the rule
of paying interest from one year after the testator's
death in spite of a statute giving the executor one year
from issuance of letters in which to settle the estate,
the Supreme Court of Vermont said:
The rule has certain advantages which we consider sufficient
to overcome all objections. It bases the allowance of interest
upon an initial point that cannot be moved by the various
accidents of settlement, and thus enables a testator to give
certainty to his bequests without the use of special provisions.
It accords substantially with what may properly be considered
the intention of a testator whose will is silent as to interest;
for it is doubtless true that p'ills are ordinarily made in expectation of the usual course of settlement. But, if the probating
of the will or the granting of letters is made the controlling
factor, the value of a bequest may be lessened by a postponement of payment without interest, on the happening of a great
variety of contingencies which the testator cannot be supposed
to have in contemplation. When this takes place, the scheme
of the ordinary will is reversed and the more favorable
bequests are lessened in value to increase the remainder. 14
Thus, if the estate is productive, the residuary legatees,
to whom will go the accumulated earnings, including the
earnings on so much of the estate as will eventually
be used to pay the general legacies, could, by delaying
the probate of the will or issuance of letters through a
13 Carr v. Bennett, 3 Dem. Sur. 433; In re Wallace's Estate, 24 N. Y.
St. 405.
14 Woodward's Estate v. Kolton et al., 78 Vt. 254.
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contest, enrich themselves at the expense of the general
legatees.
No statute exists in Illinois which gives the executor
a definite, minimum period in which to settle the estate.
From a reference to the statute providing that the executor file an annual account until the estate is closed, 15
it would seem perhaps, that he has an indefinite time if
the nature of the estate reasonably requires it. If he
unjustly refuses to close the estate after two and onehalf years, he may become personally liable to pay interest at the rate of ten per cent on the funds he withholds.1 6
This provision, however, appears not so much to set a
usual time for closing an estate as to penalize the executor for neglect and bad faith, for, if the estate reasonably requires to be kept open after that lime the executor
is not liable under the statute. That portion of our
statutes which most nearly fixes a time for closing an
estate is that section which bars the claims of creditors
17
after a period of one year from the issuance of letters.
Legacies are not customarily paid before that time since
the executor wishes to feel secure in the fact that all
enforceable claims are filed before he undertakes to make
distribution. It can hardly be said, however, that the
executor must distribute the estate at that time. Considering, therefore, that the rule that legacies shall draw
interest (to be paid by the estate, not the executor personally) to start one year from the testator's death
tends more strictly to carry out the presumed intention
of the testator in the greater number of cases, and that
there exists no statute inconsistent with this rule in
Illinois, it seems to be a proper one to follow in this
state.
While, as a general proposition, it is quite uniformly
held that no interest is payable until one year from the
testator's death (or in certain states, one year from the
date of letters or the conventional time of closing the
estate), certain recognized exceptions arise from the
15 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929), Ch. 3, par. 114.
16 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929), Ch. 3, par. 116.
17Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929), Ch. 3, par. 71.
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nature of the legacy or of the legatee where interest
is construed to be payable from the date of the testator's
death. These exceptions have not been created at the
mere whim of the courts but are based on reason and
justice. The exceptions that have come to be recognized
generally are in cases such as the following: legacies to
a child of the testator or one to whom he stood in loco
parentis, a legacy to the testator's widow where it is
given in lieu of dower, a legacy given in satisfaction
of a debt, specific legacies, gifts of the residue of the
estate or an aliquot part thereof, and annuities.
Legacies to the testator's child or one to whom he
stood in loco parentis, in the absence of any contrary
intention in the will, bear interest from the date of the
testator's death whether or not the testator has postponed the enjoyment (but not the vesting) of the corpus
of the gift.1 8 The rule is not based on a theory of legal
obligation but on the presumed intention of the testator
to provide for the maintenance of the infants that he
1
voluntarily undertook to support during his lifetime.U
But before this rule-or exception to the rule--can
apply, it must appear that the child is a minor and without other provision for his support prior to the time
when he would receive the corpus of the legacy or prior
to the time when he would be entitled to receive the interest on his legacy, if the gift be one of interest. 20 While
the rule operates in favor of a child of the testator, it
will not apply to any other minor to whom the testator
did not stand in loco parentis. Thus, it will23 not benefit
22
a grandchild, 21 a niece, nor a natural child.
18Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. Jr. 10; Williamson v. Williamson, 6
Paige 298; McWilliams v. Falcon, 59 N. C. 235; White et ux. v.
Donnell et al., 3 Md. Ch. 526.
19 Brown v. Knapp et al., 79 N. Y. 136.
20 Lyon v. Industrial School Association, 127 N. Y. 402; Raven v.
Waite, 1 Swanst. 553; Sullivan et ux. v. Winthrop et al., 23 Fed.
Cas. 371.
21Van Bramer et ux. v. Executors of Hoffman, 2 Johns. Cas. 200;
Fuller v. Gale et al., 78 N. H. 544; Vonder Horst v. Vonder Horst, 88
Md. 129; Smith v. Moore, 25 Vt. 127.
22 Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. Jr. 10; Curtis & Wife v. Potter's Admr.,
1 Houst. 382; Lyon v. Industrial School Association, 127 N. Y. 402.
23 Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 Yes. Jr. 301.
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Cases such as these should not be confused with those
where the testator has expressed the intention that the
legacy be used for maintenance and support, for some
states hold that in such cases the clear intent of the testator must control whether the legatee is a minor or an
adult and whether or24 not he stood in the relation of a
child to the testator.
Although there is in these decisions nothing which
would apparently conflict with the policy of the law in
Illinois, it is doubtful if occasion would ever arise to
apply the rule in a case where the child would be entitled
to either the corpus or interest of his legacy from the
usual time-one year from the testator's death-since
provision is now made for the children of the testator
in the statutes by way of an award for maintenance
during the year of probate. 25 No reason appears, however, why the rule should not apply where the time of
payment is postponed, as in the case of a gift of a sum
to the testator's son at twenty-one.
Where a legacy is given to the testator's widow and is
expressed to be in lieu of dower, no other provision having been made for her support, the courts have sometimes been inclined to allow the widow interest on her
legacy from the date of the testator's death. 26 There
is much controversy on this point, however, and while
many decisions have listed this as one of the exceptions
to the general rule it has, in most instances, been dictum.
No English cases are found including this as an exception. Although they are well settled that a widow is not
included in the same class as a minor child of the testator who is entitled to interest from the date of his
death under the presumption of his intention to provide
maintenance for the child, 27 they do not seem to raise
24In re Condon's Estate, 105 Kan. 714; Townsend's Appeal, 106
Pa. St. 268.
25 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929), Ch. 3, pars. 75, 78.
26Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige 298; Towle v. Swasey, 106
Mass. 100. But not if there is no estate of which the widow is
dowable, Gill's Appeal, 2 Pa. St. 221.
27 Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 Ves. Jr. 301; Raven v. Waite, 1 Swanst.
553.
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the point of dower at all or recognize any exception in
favor of the widow. 2
An early New York decision
gave a widow interest on her legacy from the date of
the testator's death, the legacy being in lieu of dower,
but the legacy was a part of the residuum of the estate
and that alone would have been sufficient to entitle her
29
to interest from the death of the testator.
Massachusetts is strongly in favor of the exception.
There, in spite of a statute providing that the widow
loses her right to dower if she does not waive the provisions of the will within six months, it was held that
"The widow's title to dower is paramount; if she accepts
the provisions of the will as a substitute for this legal
right, she takes not strictly as a beneficiary but as a
purchaser for a valuable consideration," and interest
30
was allowed her from the testator's death.
New Jersey and Pennsylvania are quite positive that
no exception should be made for the widow even though
the legacy is in lieu of dowerA1 A legacy given in satisfaction of a debt is recognized as bearing interest from
the date of the testator's death, 32 and it is sometimes
attempted to put the reason for interest on legacies in
lieu of dower on the same basis. In criticism of this
tendency the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
The reason given in Clark v. Sewell for excepting the case of a
creditor, is that because the debt is extinguishable presently, the
legacy, to extinguish it, must also be payable presently; for
which cause it is, and not for any inherent virtue or desert in

his claim, that a creditor's case is an exception to the general
rule that a legacy is not demandable within the year. It is
made so to effectuate the manifest intention of the testator. In
addition, it is obvious that if the debt were not extinguished
till the expiration of a year, it would bear interest in the mean25 See cases discussed in 2 Roper on Legacies (1st American Ed.),
p. 29202.
Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige 298.
30 Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100.
31 Howard v. Francis, 30 N. J. Eq. 444 (although such legacies do
not abate with general legacies); Gill's Appeal, 2 Pa. St. 221.
32

Clark v. Sewell, 3 Atk. 96.
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time; and it is consequently immaterial whether the interest
be paid on the debt or the legacy. A widow's dower, however,
is extinguished, not by present payment of her legacy, but
by her election to take it in satisfaction; and as it does not
bear interest in the meantime, there is no occasion to allow

interest on the substitute. Should the widow not think the
legacy, without interest, a fair equivalent for her dower, she
33
is not bound to take it.
By statute in Illinois, the widow is presumed to take
under the will unless within one year from issuance of
letters she elects to take dower.8 4 In other words, she
has no dower at any time after the testator 's death unless
she chooses to assert her right to it within the time prescribed. Accordingly, no reason exists for payment of
interest on a legacy in lieu of dower, for it is not by
the will but by the statute that the dower is barred, and
by statute there is no dower to draw interest before
renunciation of the provisions of the will. Furthermore,
since it is held that the presumed intention of the testator to provide maintenance for his minor child does
not extend to adults, the widow would be entitled to no
interest for the year succeeding the testator's death on
that theory. But granting that such a theory might be
recognized in Illinois, if interest is given only where
the widow is otherwise unprovided for, there is, in Illinois, no reason for-allowing interest, because the widow
is entitled to a widow's award for maintenance during
5
the period of administration.3
Interest on specific legacies apparently has always
been allowed from the date of the testator's death. Specific legacies are deemed to be severed from the rest
of the testator's estate from the time of his deathidentified as belonging to the beneficiary from that time.
Since such legacies do not abate with general legacies
Gill's Appeal, 2 Pa. St. 221.
34Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929), Ch. 41, pars. 10, 11; Warren v. Warren,
148 Ill. 641. Contrast this with Mass. St. 1861, c. 164, where if the
widow does not waive the provisions of the will within six months,
she loses her right to dower.
35 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929), Ch. 3, par. 75.
83
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in the payment of the testator's debts, they may be paid
at once if there is no likelihood that the balance of the
estate will be exhausted. Any increase of the specific
property bequeathed, such as interest, rent, hire or other
form of profit, would therefore go with the gift. 6 The
same rule has been held to apply to demonstrative legacies. 7 The characteristics of these legacies are recognized in Illinois,35 and there appears no reason why an
exception to the general rule in their case should not be
made here as in other states.
Much the same reason applies to the exception made
in the case of legacies of the residuum or an aliquot
part thereof. Where the residuum is given outright, no
one claims interest thereon other than the legatee himself; so no question is involved. But a question does
arise where one legatee is given the income of the residue
for life with remainder over to another. Should the
income produced during the year following the testator's
death be added to the principal, giving the beneficiary
for life the income on the augmented fund starting from
a year after the testator 's death, or should the income
beneficiary be entitled to the earnings of the fund from
the testator's death? Seldom has the question not been
decided in favor of the beneficiary for life.39 The exception in this case "does not rest on the presumption that
the life interest was given for support, but on the equity
which seeks to give to each (the life tenant and the
remainderman) his due."14 0 It is the intention of the
testator that the beneficiary for life receive the income
36 Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. Sr. 563; Barrington v. Tristam, 6
Ves. Jr. 345; Wheeler v. Hathaway, 54 Mich. 547; Rachels & Wife
et al. v. V.imbish, 31 Ga. 214.
37 McWilliams v. Falcon, 59 N. C. 235.
35 Dauel v. Arnold, 201 Ill. 570.
39Angerstein v. Martin, 1 Turn. & Russ. 231; Hewitt v. Morris,
1 Turn. & Russ. 241; Weld et al. v. Putnam et al., 70 Me. 209; Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige 298; Rachels & Wife et al. v. Wimbish,
31 Ga. 214; Spangler's Estate, 9 Watts & Serg. 141; Bancroft v.
Security Co. of Hartford, 74 Conn. 218; In re Brown's Estate, 190 Pa.
St. 464; Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co. v. McCurdy et al., 11 Del.
Ch. 156; In the Matter of the Accounting of Benson et al., 96 N. Y.
499; In re Leitsch's Will, 185 Wis. 257; Green v. Green, 30 N. J. Eq.
451. Contra, White v. Chaplin, 148 Atl. 21 (N. H. 1929).
40 Green v. Green, 30 N. J. Eq. 451.
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during the remainder of his entire life-not one year
less than the remainder-and, if it is not impracticable,
his intention should be carried out. When the decedent's
personal estate conies to the hands of the executor a
large portion of it no doubt consists of income-producing
investments selected by the testator in his lifetime. It
is not difficult for him to keep the income separate from
the corpus of the estate and use only principal in payment of debts and expenses of administration. In fact,
this is what most corporate executors in Illinois do.
The entire earnings, less any expenses during the year of
administration properly chargeable to income, would
then be paid to the income beneficiary at the end of the
year.
The rule in England is that the first payment of an
annuity should be made one year from the date of the
testator's death, "but if a legacy is given for life, with
remainder over, no interest is due till the end of two
years. ,4, The exception with respect to annuities accruing from the testator's death arises from its unique
character.
"An annuity", as defined by our own Supreme Court,
"technically is a certain yearly sum granted to a person
in fee or for life or for years, chargeable only on the
person of the grantor. It is used ihi a broader sense to
designate a fixed sum payable periodically, subject to
such limitations as the grantor may impose, and it may
be charged on the real estate as well as on the person.'
It is generally agreed in this country that the first payment of an annuity is due at the end of one year from
the testator's death, or if it is payable in more frequent
periods, such as semi- or quarter-annually, the first payment would be due at the end of the first period. 4 3 If a
fixed sum, it apparently would have to be paid at all
41 Gibson v. Bott, 7 Ves. Jr. 89.

42 Routt v. Newman, 253 Ill. 185.
43 Curran et al. v. Green et ux., 18 R. I. 329; Simmons v. Hubbard,
50 Conn. 574; Rucker v. Maddox et al., 114 Ga. 899; Wiggin, Administrator v. Swett, 6 Metc. 194; Lenore v. Blocker, Harp. Eq. (S. C.)
272; In re Batchelor, 119 Mass. 239.

INTEREST ON LEGACIES

events, that is, whether there were sufficient income produced or not, and in the event of a failure of income it
would have to be paid from principal. 4 4 If it were all as
simple as this no difficulty would arise, but it has been
held that the language of the will may restrict the
annuity to income generally, or to a specific fund.4 5 In
Craig v. Craig,4" where there was a direction to invest
a sum of money enough to produce in legal interest at
least five hundred dollars, it was held to be an annuity.
Pennsylvania has gone so far as to say there is no distinction between a gift of income, that is, a gift of all
47
the income produced by a certain fund, and an annuity.
Therefore, in Pennsylvania, where the testator bequeathed
ten thousand dollars to his executors, in trust, to put
out at interest and to pay and apply the interest and
income thereof to the testator's sister, it was held that
the sister was entitled to interest accruing during the
year following the testator's death.48
New York was early influenced by the Pennsylvania
rule, and while the case of Cooke v. Meeker 49 could have
been decided on other grounds, it was there broadly
stated that "the authorities would seem abundant therefore, to sustain the doctrine that when a sum is left in
trust, with a direction that the interest and income should
be applied to the use of a person, such person is entitled
to the interest thereof from the date of the testator's
death." Even after the decision in Cooke v. Meeker the
Surrogate Courts refused to apply this doctrine in cases
of non-residuary legacies, but maintained that the decision in that case turned upon the fact that the legatee
was a minor, thereby bringing the case within one of
44Additon v. Smith, 83 Me. 551; Stamper v. Pickering, 9 Sim. 176;
but see Graves v. Hicks, 11 Sim. 536, where the court refuses to
order real estate to be sold to pay annuity.
45Einbecker v. Einbecker, 162 Ill. 267; In re Pierce, 56 Wis. 560;
Morgan et al. v. Pope et al., 47 Tenn. 541; Homer et al. v. Landis
et al., 95 Md. 320.
46 3 Barb. Ch. 76.
47 Eyre v. Golding, 5 Binney 472; Spangler's Estate, 9 Watts & Serg.
135.
48 Hilyard's Estate, 5 Watts & Serg. 30.
49 36 N. Y. 15.
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the exceptions, and that consequently the broad proposition there quoted was dictum. But the Court of Appeals
finally passed upon the question directly, supporting the
dictum in Cook v. Meeker,50 and New York now follows
Pennsylvania; although in New York for purposes of
taxation the distinction between an annuity and a gift of
income is well recognized. 51
On the other hand, in many states there is a sharp
line of demarcation between an annuity and a gift of
the income of a particular fund for life. Such states
recognize that an annuity accrues 52 from the date of the
testator's death, but the interest from a general fund of
a specific amount does not accrue until a year from the
testator's death.5 35 4 This distinction has also been recognized in England.
Judging by strict legal principles, a doctrine which recognizes this distinction appears more sound than one
which does not. If an annuity is a fixed sum payable
annually, the annual payment will not vary in amount,
regardless of the fact that the fund from which it is
paid may earn more in one year than another, and where
the fund earns less the payments go on until the corpus
of the fund is exhausted. Of course, if the testator limits
the fund for payment of an annuity to the income of
a particular fund or of real estate, as he may do,5 5 and
50 In re Stanfield's Estate, 135 N. Y. 292, holding that if the estate
is productive interest from a non-residuary trust would be payable
from the date of death. See also In re O'Hara's Executors, 44 N. Y.
Supp. 222.
51 Whitson et al. v. Whitson, 53 N. Y. 479. See also In re Dewey's
Estate, 153 N. Y. 63, where a widow was given the income from
$12,000 annually for life, but the net estate was less than $12,000,
and the court held that the provision was meant as a gift of income
and not as an annuity, so that the widow could not have the deficiency
in annual payments made up from the corpus of the estate.
52 By this, it is not meant to convey the idea that the annuity is
apportionable.
53 Welsh v. Brown, 43 N. J. L. 37; Bartlett v. Slater et al., 53 Conn.
102; In re Brown's Estate, 143 Cal. 450. The New York Surrogate
cases, now overruled in that state, are in line with this view: Carr
v. Bennett, 3 Dem. Sur. 433; Lawrence v. Embree, 3 Bradf. Sur. 364;
Booth v. Ammerman, 4 Bradf. Sur. 129.
54 Baker v. Baker, H. of L. Cas. 616; Birch v. Sherratt, L. R. 2
Ch. App. 649; Gibson v. Bott, 7 Yes. Jr. 96.
55Einbecker v. Einbecker, 162 Ill. 267; In re Pierce, 56 Wis. 560;
Morgan et al. v. Pope et al., 47 Tenn. 541.
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the income in any one year should be less than the
annuity, the annuity would abate proportionately. But,
if the fund produced more than enough to cover the
annuity, the annuity would not thereby be increased.
Since an annuity is, then, of a fixed sum, and generally
not dependent upon the earnings of a fund unascertained
until a year after the testator's death, there is no objection to its accruing from the testator's death.
However, if the interest of a specific sum is to be paid
to a beneficiary for life with remainder in the fund to
another, the fund is not required to be set up by the
executor until a year from the testator's death, for the
fund would abate with other general legacies, and hence
the executor would have a year in which to determine
whether it will be called upon to pay debts. As the New
Jersey court so aptly phrased it,
A bequest of a specific sum of money is one gift, one legacy,
the benefit of which the testator has apportioned between the

donee for life and the remainderman. To the life tenant he
has given the interest or produce of the fund during life, and
the capital sum to the remainderman after the death of the
former. Such a legacy is, therefore, subject to the rule that
general legacies are to take effect and be payable at the
expiration of one year from the testator's death. The executor is not bound' to set apart the legacy for investment
before the end of the year, and until that be done, there is
no fund to produce the interest that is payable to the life
tenant. 56
This was the reasoning applied in Carr v. Beinett,7
where the will directed the executor to "invest the sum
of four thousand dollars in bonds and mortgages," and
provided that "the interest thereof, after paying said
executor a suitable fee for looking after said fund, shall
be paid annually to said Jennette Carr, and at the death
of said Jennette Carr the whole of the above bequest
shall be equally divided between the children of said
56

Welsh v. Brown, 43 N. J. L. 44.

573

Dem. Sur. 433.

CHICAGO-KENT

REVIEW

Jennette." Here, the beneficiary for life asked interest
on the four thousand dollars from the date of the testator's death, but the court held that this was a general
legacy, not falling within any of the exceptions to the
general rule, and that interest began to run only at the
expiration of a year from the testator's death. In Bartlett v. Slater et al." the testator bequeathed one million
dollars to his son-in-law in trust to pay the income arising therefrom to the testator's granddaughter, and the
court held that notwithstanding the executors were, by
the will, permitted to pay the legacy to the trustee within
one year after the testator's death, the granddaughter
was entitled to no interest during the first year, the
executors not having made payment to the trustee.
On what principle of law is the Pennsylvania rule
based ? The first case of importance on this point in that
state was Eyre v. Golding."9 The court held that a bequest of the interest of four hundred pounds to be paid
annually to the testator's daughter during her natural
life was the same as an annuity and gave the daughter
interest for the year following the testator's death. In
his opinion, Tilghman, C. J., said, "There is a difference
between a legacy of a sum of money to one for a term
of life and a bequest of a sum to be paid annually for
life." This is undoubtedly true if by the latter he meant
a fixed sum to be paid annually and not merely the income
from a sum of money. But the case before him certainly
was not one of a fixed sum, for clearly the interest on
four hundred pounds could vary materially from year
to year and the beneficiary would receive as much or as
little as the fund produced. Does it make a difference
that no trustee was named to put the fund out at interest? No principle of law is more fundamental than that
a trust will not fail for want of a trustee, and certainly
one would be appointed if it were only the executor himself. Does it make a difference that no remainderman
was named? Where the will names no remainderman,
58 53 Conn. 102.

59 5 Binney 472.
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the principal would either fall into the residuum ° or,
in Illinois, would pass as intestate property under the
statute.' 1 In its essential characteristics, therefore, the
provision in Eyre v. Golding is no different from that
in Welsh v. Brown, above quoted, where the testatrix
gave her niece the interest of twenty-five hundred dollars, to be paid to her annually by the executor, and upon
the death of the niece to divide the principal sum among
her children. To support his proposition that the income
was payable from the date of the testator's death, Justice Tilghman cited Angerstein v. Martin, and Hewitt v.
Morris.6 2 Both of these cases, however, had to do with
interest on the residue of estates and for that reason
were not in point. The Justice also cited Roper on Legacies, which discussed no case in accord with his proposition. The later decisions in Pennsylvania were controlled
by Eyre v. Golding and did not make a careful study
of the true differences between gifts of income and
6

annuities.

3

Since, New York also was started in its doctrine by a
decision which made no apparent distinction between the
various exceptions to the general rule, the New Jersey,
Connecticut, and California cases stand out as supporting by far the sounder proposition of law.
Certain Massachusetts cases have been cited as supporting the same rule that Pennsylvania does, but an
examination of the case in Massachusetts reveals that
the decisions are there controlled by statute. Thus,
where a testator dlled to his brother the sum of one
hundred thousand dollars in trust to have all the income
during his life with power and authority to use so much
of the principal sum for his own use as he should find
60 Caldwell National Bank v. Rickard et al., 143 Atl. 745 (N. J. Ch.
1928); Dunn v. Kearney, 288 Ill.49.
61 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St., Ch. 39, sec. 12. That these omissions were
not considered determining factors in the establishment of the Pennsylvania rule is apparent in the later cases of Hilyard's Estate, 5
Watts & "Serg. 30, and Spangler's Estate, 9 Watts and Serg. 135,
where there is a trustee and a remainderman.
62 1 Turn. & Russ. 232 and 1 Turn. & Russ. 241.
65Rhode Island was also influenced by Eyre v. Golding in Trott
v. Wheaton, 5 R. I. 353.
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occasion for and elect to use and expend, it was held
that under the statute64 the brother was entitled to interest from the date of the testator's death.6 5 The same
statute was in existence when the earlier case of Sargent
v. Sargent,66 also sometimes cited, was decided. If the
reasoning of the Pennsylvania court had been recognized
in Massachusetts, why should the latter state have passed
a statute to settle the question? This point is even
more clearly made in California. In that state the code
provides that "in the case of a bequest of the interest
or income of a certain sum or fund, the income accrues
from the testator's death," and yet the decision in In re
Brown's Estate was that this provision would not apply
where the fund was directed by the will to be paid to
trustees, by them to be invested and the income to be
paid to a life beneficiary, because the trustees could not
begin payment until they received the fund and invested
it so as to produce an income.6 7 That the code might
not change the rule even where the income is to be paid
by the executor is inferable from the decision in Mackey
v. Mackey et al.65 And it is certain that where there is
no such statute it can make no difference that the executor is given the fund in trust rather than a trustee,
because the executor would not take the fund as a trustee
until it is separated from his funds held as executor.6 9
However, whether or not the general rule is changed
by statute, the intention of the testator, as expressed in
the language of the will, is always controlling as to the
time from which interest is payable. But a difficulty
often arises in determining what language is sufficient
to alter the general rule. No method can be established
to standardize the interpretation of the words used by
64 Mass. Gen. Sts., c. 978, sec. 23, which declares that "when, by
a will, an annuity, or the rent, use, income, or interest of any property, or the income of any fund, is given to, or in trust for the benefit
of, a person for life, he shall be entitled to receive the same from
and after the decease of the testator."
65 Ayer v. Ayer, 128 Mass. 575.
66 103 Mass. 297.
67 In re Brown's Estate, 143 Cal. 450.
681 07 Cal. 303.
69 Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Ill. 484.
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testators. Each case must stand by itself. Thus, a
direction to pay a legacy "as soon as convenient" or
"within one year after my death at the convenience of
my executor" or "as soon as practicable" have been
70
held insufficient to change the general rule.
On the other hand, in Tennessee, where the general
rule that pecuniary legacies draw interest from the end
of the first year is recognized, it was held that where a
will declared, "I do set apart out of my estate in the
hand of my executor, the sum of four thousand dollars,
to be held by my executor subject to the following trust,"
interest should be allowed from the date of death because
the intention was shown by the will that the legacy should
be paid at that time. 71 A provision that a six thousand
dollar bequest should be paid by any six one thousand
dollar five per cent bonds that the trustee might choose,
indicated the intention of the testatrix that the beneficiary should receive the income from the selected bonds
from the date of the testatrix's death.7 2 In order to
evoke the construction that interest was intended from
the date of death, the testator's intention as indicated
by his will should be, in some way, to separate from the
estate as a whole the particular legacy on which interest
is claimed. The testator's intention, of course, could
postpone as well as hasten the time of payment and if a
legacy is expressly declared to be payable at a future
date, the legatee would not be entitled either to his legacy
73
or interest thereon until that time arrived.
When interest is deemed to be payable on a legacy
other than on a specific or residuary legacy, it is customary to pay simple interest at the legal rate. 74 From
the nature of specific and residuary legacies the same
rule cannot apply. The specific legacy is at once identified and segregated so that the legatee receives the
70 Griggs v. Veghte, 47 N. J. Eq. 179; Bartlett v. Slater et al., 53
Conn. 102; vernet v. Williams, 3 Dem. Sur. 348.
71 Harrison v. Henderson et al., 54 Tenn. 315, 347.
72 Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Fowler et al., 102 Conn. 318.
73 Wheeler v. Ruthven et al., 74 N. Y. 428.
74 Welch v. Adams, 152 Mass. 74 and other cases there cited; Calloway and others v. Langhorne and Wife, 25 Va. 181.
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increase and profits arising therefrom, whether or not
the specific property is actually delivered to him. Under
the circumstances he would not be entitled to any additional interest, even if what was earned by the specific
property were less than the legal rate. Interest is given
because the use of the legacy is withheld, but in the case
of a specific legacy no more would be earned by that
property after delivery than before. On a residuary
legacy the net earnings of the estate during the year of
administration is the measure of interest allowed whether
this is more or less than the legal rate. No benefit would
be derived by paying more, for, as the residuary estate
is the fund from which interest is paid, the legatee
would be merely paying himself interest.
The question may be asked, "How do we know that any
interest at all would be given on legacies in Illinois,
since the Supreme Court has not definitely passed upon
the point?" A very strong argument in answer to this
question was made by Albert M. Kales in his article
entitled, Do Legacies Bear Interest in Illinois?7 5 And,
while it may have no authoritative value, an early countycourt decision recognized not only the fact that interest
is paid, but that ol general legacies it is paid from a
year after the testator's death.7 6 The Appellate Court
in one case 77 gave interest at five per cent, the legal rate
in Illinois, to start from the date of the final account
but did not discuss the time when interest should start
to run. It merely decided that under the circumstances
of that case the allowance of interest to the legatees was
proper.
One case arose in this state which was exactly in point
and would have settled all further argument if the court
had not sidestepped the question here considered. The
testator had made, among other bequests, two of six
2 Ill. Law Rev. 440.
v. Greenebaum, 1 Chicago Legal News 210, (County
Court of Cook County, 1869). This case also held that the court may
compel the executor to put money out at interest and also pay part
or all of a legacy before the estate is closed upon the furnishing of
a refunding bond.
77 Fraser v. Fraser, 149 Ill. App. 186.
75

76Eichhold
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thousand dollars and one of four thousand dollars to
be held in trust by his executor for the life of the beneficiaries with remainder over at their death. The will
also gave the executor five years from his letters testamentary in which to "complete all collections and sales
and distributions (moneys in trust not included)." Another provision was that "all the proceeds of my estate,
including cash on hand and what may be realized as
above and from all other sources, shall be divided, paid
out and distributed as follows and as promptly as he
[the executor] may find practicable."
The executor
refused to pay the legatees the income from their legacies, maintaining that they were not entitled to receive
any income until after the final settlement of the estate,
which might be five years from the date of his letters.
But it was held:
The legacies are not payable to the complainants and they are
entitled only to the income, but it appears that the income
actually produced was at least equal to the legal rate of interest
claimed by the bill, which is all that was asked for.
A rule which is perhaps somewhat arbitrary, but which has
been generally adopted where no time has been fixed by the
will for payment of a general legacy, is that it is payable at
the expiration of one year from the testator's death and draws
interest from that time. The question whether that rule ought
to be adopted by this court in case of such a legacy is not
involved in this case and is not decided, but it is quite clear
that its application, uider the facts of the case, would be
entirely just and fair to the remaindermen73

The court also pointed out that where one person is
acting in the capacity of executor and trustee his duties
are separate and distinct and he does not take the fund
as trustee until it is separated from the general funds in
his hands as executor. This indicates that no distinction
should be made between a fund held by the executor as
trustee and a fund to be paid to another as trustee with
respect to the time the fund begins to draw interest.
78Fenton v. Hall, 235 Ill. 553.
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In conclusion, then, the rules which have been established in other jurisdictions and which might, consistently with our laws, be followed in Illinois are the
following:
1. Pecuniary legacies draw interest from the time
when they are payable.
2. When no time for payment is indicated by the will,
general pecuniary legacies may, for convenience and justice, be deemed payable one year from the testator's
death, and they will draw interest from that time.
3. Where a legacy is given to minor child of the
testator or a minor to whom he stood in loco parentis
and the child has no other means of support, it may
have interest on its legacy from the testator's death.
4. A legacy expressly given, or construed to be given,
in payment of a debt will draw interest from the testator's death.
5. A legatee who is given a specific legacy is entitled
to all the increase, income, interest, dividends, rent, or
other form of profit derived from the specific property
from the testator's death.
6. The beneficiary of a residuary trust (composed
of all or part of the residuum) is entitled to the net
earnings of the estate, or his share of the residuum, from
the date of the testator's death.
7. An annuitant is entitled to receive the first payment on his annuity at the end of the first interval,
according to the frequency of payments fixed by the will,
and if no interval is fixed by the will, at the end of
one year from the testator's death.
8. A beneficiary who is given the use or income of a
designated sum of money for life or years is entitled
to interest to be figured at the legal rate starting from
one year after the testator's death, to be paid at the
end of the first interval elapsing after the one year, to
continue, of course, only until the principal sum is paid
to the trustee.

